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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article provides an update of case law during the Survey pe-
riod that has had, or may have, an impact on franchises and deal-
erships in Texas. In reviewing the opinions from Texas courts and
federal courts in the Fifth Circuit that dealt with franchise and dealership
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issues, however, 2010 was not a year of significant decisions. Nonethe-
less, it was a period during which courts continued to refine and answer
questions about jurisdictional issues, enforce the plain meaning of agree-
ments between the parties-including forum selection and arbitration
clauses-and advise parties under what circumstances courts would dis-
miss or uphold antitrust and trademark claims.
II. FRANCHISE BASICS
There were no significant developments in basic franchise, business op-
portunity, or dealership laws in Texas or the Fifth Circuit during the Sur-
vey period. It has been a few years since the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") issued the revised Federal Franchise Rule ("the Rule") and
there have yet to be major developments since the Rule was issued.
III. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
"[JI]nexact compliance is no compliance."1 During the Survey period,
the Fifth Circuit reminded us that jurisdiction is a "strict master."'2 In
SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, the Fifth Circuit re-examined the im-
mediate effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), holding
that unless the order's language provides otherwise, a stipulation of dis-
missal under Rule 41 will be effective upon filing, notwithstanding any
other action by the district court.3 In SmalBizPros v. MacDonald,
SmallBizPros (which does business as Padgett Business Services) filed
suit against Frank MacDonald in district court in the Western District of
Texas.4 The suit arose from the termination of a franchise agreement.5
Following the initial complaint, Padgett and MacDonald settled their dis-
pute, announced the settlement to the district court, and filed a stipula-
tion of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.6 The stipulation attached a
stipulated settlement order (the Order), which the district court signed a
week after the parties filed the stipulation. 7
MacDonald refused to comply with certain terms of the settlement
agreement, and the district court issued a contempt order a little over a
month after signing the Order.8 The district court stated that it retained
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement by signing the Order,
thus retaining the jurisdiction to issue the contempt order.9 MacDonald
appealed. MacDonald asserted that the district court did not retain juris-
1. SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 462.








diction to issue the contempt order because the court's jurisdiction ceased
with the filing of the stipulation. 10
The Fifth Circuit agreed. The Fifth Circuit highlighted that "[e]xcept in
special circumstances... a voluntary order of dismissal requested by both
parties is effective upon filing and does not require the approval of the
court."'" The court noted that unless the parties provide for an express
contingency or an express extension of jurisdiction, the district court's
jurisdiction will not extend past the filing of the stipulation.' 2 In support
of its holding, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America.13 In Kokkonen,
the Supreme Court analyzed a district court's ancillary jurisdiction under
Rule 41 and held:
[P]ursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii), the par-
ties executed a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice,
dismissing the complaint and cross-complaint . . . [T]he District
Judge signed the Stipulation and Order under the notation "It is so
ordered." The Stipulation and Order did not reserve jurisdiction in
the District Court to enforce the settlement agreement; indeed it did
not so much as refer to the settlement agreement.14
The Supreme Court in Kokkonen unanimously held that the district
court did not retain jurisdiction to issue any enforcement order.15
The Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, did suggest ways in which the district
court could have retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settle-
ment agreement. 16 The parties could have required compliance with the
terms of the settlement agreement as part of the dismissal order, could
have incorporated such terms in the dismissal order, 17 or, the dismissal
order could have expressly stated that the court retained jurisdiction over
the settlement agreement. 18
In any of the scenarios, however, the parties must agree that the district
court retain ancillary jurisdiction. Here, the stipulation did not contain
such language. Although the stipulation did include language requesting
the district court to sign the order, the Fifth Circuit held that the stipula-
tion's effectiveness was not "expressly contingent" upon the entry of the
order.19 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the order was "superflu-
ous;" it did not contain any agreed upon language for the district court to
retain jurisdiction. 20 The Fifth Circuit held that the district court lacked
10. Id.
11. Id. at 461 (citing Ramming v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 366, 369
n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)).
12. Id.
13. 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
14. Id. at 376-77.
15. Id. at 381-82.
16. SmallBizPros, 618 F.3d at 462-63.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 462.




jurisdiction to issue any contempt order because the district court did not
retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.21
These reminders by the court are excellent practice pointers for liti-
gators. To ensure that a court maintains jurisdiction simply requires in-
clusion of settlement agreement compliance language as part of the order
of dismissal, incorporation of the settlement terms into the dismissal or-
der, or a clear statement that the court will retain jurisdiction in the dis-
missal order. Doing none of these things will ensure that the court does
not retain jurisdiction, which ultimately occurred in SmalBizPros.
In franchise litigation, federal jurisdiction may often be established
through Lanham Act claims. Franchisors and franchisees are commonly
in dispute regarding use of the franchisor's trademarks, trade dress, logos,
and other proprietary and confidential information, particularly after the
expiration or termination of a franchise agreement. What is not as com-
mon is a declaratory judgment action between a franchisor and an exclu-
sive distributor for which federal jurisdiction is established when the
initial use of the trademark arose from a contract. In Go Figure, Inc. v.
Curves International, Inc.,22 the district court addressed whether it had
subject matter jurisdiction where an exclusive distributor sought a decla-
ration of the right to use Curves' trademark to sell key tags.
Go Figure, Inc. developed and sold club management software to
Curves' franchisees. 23 The software used key-tags with Curves' logo en-
graved on each key-tag. Curves and Go Figure executed a contract,
whereby Curves granted Go Figure the right to be the exclusive provider
of this software (with an incidental intellectual property right to use
Curves' logo). The contract terminated in May 2009. Go Figure, how-
ever, continued to sell the software with the engraved key tags to Curves'
franchisees following termination. Curves alleged that Go Figure no
longer had authorization to use the key-tags with Curves' logo after
termination.24
Go Figure filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration
that it had the right to continue to sell the key tags with Curves' logo,
notwithstanding termination of the contract. Curves filed a motion to
dismiss asserting that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Curves contended that Go Figure's claim was simply based on a breach of
contract theory. Conversely, Go Figure argued that any suit against it
would be based on trademark infringement under the Lanham Act-a
federal question. The district court agreed with Go Figure.25
The district court explained that although the Declaratory Judgment
Act ("Act") authorizes certain remedies, jurisdiction cannot be based on
21. Id.
22. No. H-09-2930, 2010 WL 142441, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2010) (Haynes and







this Act. 26 "[T]o award relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
courts must have an independent basis for jurisdiction. '27 Go Figure had
the burden to show that there would be jurisdiction over any claim by
Curves against Go Figure.28 Go Figure met its burden. 29 Go Figure ac-
knowledged that the contract did not expressly grant Go Figure any right
to use Curves' trademark. Therefore, any issue regarding the improper
use of Curves' trademark, particularly following termination of the con-
tract, would be based on a claim for trademark infringement. Although
the district court held that Go Figure established federal question juris-
diction and denied Curves' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, Go Figure's concession
that the contract did not permit-implicitly or otherwise-its use of
Curves' trademark was an interesting position to take. Go Figure sur-
vived Curves' jurisdictional challenge, but survival of the substantive
claims may be more difficult.30
During the Survey period, the Dallas appellate court outlined the sepa-
rateness of franchisors and franchisees, such that jurisdiction cannot be
established based on "necessary forms of franchise operations [that] are
common between franchisors and franchisees. '31 In Tampa Bay Towing
v. Moyer, a franchisee's employee sued the Florida franchisee and its
franchisor in Texas under a corporate veil-piercing theory.32 The em-
ployee's injury occurred in Florida. The employee, however, alleged that
Texas had jurisdiction over both the franchisee, Tampa Bay, and its
franchisor, Sea Tow International, because Sea Tow controlled Tampa
Bay's boat types, insurance carrier, corporate software, logo, marketing
materials, e-mail capability, and membership directory, among other
things. 33 Tampa Bay argued that it was a separate business entity that
maintained separate officers, directors, financials, and day-to-day opera-
tions. 34 The trial court denied Tampa Bay's special appearance and
Tampa Bay appealed.
The trial court discussed the standards for jurisdiction-general and
specific. The trial court further discussed the standard for personal juris-
diction under a corporate veil-piercing theory in particular. Unlike the
traditional burden whereby the nonresident defendant must negate all
bases of jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove jurisdiction over the defen-
dant if jurisdiction is based on a theory of piercing the corporate veil.35
Therefore, Moyer had the burden to prove that Tampa Bay and Sea Tow
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *2
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id.
31. Tampa Bay Marine Towing & Serv., Inc. v. Moyer, No. 05-08-01727-CV, 2009 WL
3956450, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
32. Id. at *1.
33. Id. at *1-2.
34. Id. at *4.
35. Id. at *2 (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798-99




operated as a single business enterprise and should be "jurisdictionally
fused. ' 36 The appellate court held that Moyer failed to meet this
burden.37
The appellate court acknowledged that Sea Tow retained controlled
over many of Tampa Bay's operations, including logos, vehicles, methods
of operations, and marketing. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that
"[r]etention of such control as well as the right to veto proposed struc-
tural changes is not sufficient to support a determination that a franchisor
'operates' the franchisee or its premises. '38 The court briefly noted that
the degree of control was not so great that the separateness of Tampa Bay
and Sea Tow should be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice. Here,
Moyer had knowledge that Tampa Bay was a franchisee. The injury took
place in Florida. Tampa Bay had no sufficient contacts with Texas and
did not do business in Texas. A franchisor may exercise control (even
substantial control to protect its brand) without subjecting its nonresident
franchisees to jurisdiction in Texas.39
Evaluating the control that a parent corporation/franchisor has over its
subsidiary/franchisee is one method used to "fuse" two corporations for
jurisdictional purposes. Another approach is to analyze the parent's con-
tacts with Texas directly. In Spir Star AG v. Kimich, the Texas Supreme
Court held that "a manufacturer is subject to specific personal jurisdic-
tion in Texas when it intentionally targets Texas as a marketplace for its
products, and that using a distributor-intermediary for that purpose pro-
vides no haven from the jurisdiction of a Texas court."'40
Spir Star AG ("AG") was a German manufacturer of hoses. 41 A few of
AG's executives established Spir Star Limited (Limited), a Texas distribu-
torship. AG specifically elected Texas as its distribution location based
on Texas's refineries and AG's energy-related products. Limited pur-
chased hoses from AG and sold those same hoses to various companies,
including Louis Kimich's employer. When an AG-manufactured hose in-
jured Kimich, Kimich sued his employer, AG, and Limited. AG filed a
special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction over it in Texas. AG
argued that it structured its transactions to avoid jurisdiction with the fo-
rum state. In support of its argument, AG showed that it and Limited did
not share profits or finances. The two companies were separate entities;
AG argued that it did not have control over Limited's business operations
and affairs such that jurisdiction over Limited would "fuse" to jurisdic-
tion over AG.42
36. Id. at *1.
37. Id. at *4-5.
38. Id. at *4 (citing Alonzo v. Mr. Gatti's Pizza, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1996, no writ)).
39. Id.





The Texas Supreme Court, however, did not focus on the theory of
piercing the corporate veil. The supreme court directed its attention to
AG's own conduct and marketing in Texas. The supreme court recog-
nized that more is needed to establish personal jurisdiction than a seller
simply placing its product into the stream of commerce.4 3 Here, AG did
more; AG satisfied the "additional conduct" standard.44 The supreme
court explained that because AG specifically targeted Texas as a market
for its hoses, AG subjected itself to a product liability suit in Texas, even
if the actual sale of the product occurred through a Texas distributor. AG
intended to profit from the Texas economy, from which AG received
35% of its annual sales.45
A plaintiff has a heightened burden to prove specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant when the sale occurred through an intermediary.
Kimich had to show a "substantial connection" between AG and the facts
underlying the litigation.46 "A nonresident manufacturer does not avoid
Texas law merely by forming a Texas affiliate or utilizing a Texas distribu-
tor to sell its products in Texas markets. '47 The supreme court concluded
that because AG and Limited agreed to be a Texas sales agent, AG's
marketing efforts directed toward Texas established jurisdiction. 48 The
supreme court also did not forgo ensuring the basic standard we learned
from International Shoe:49 exercising personal jurisdiction over AG did
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.5 0
B. FORUM SELECTION
Forum selection clause issues arise when a dispute involves multiple
parties to an agreement or multiple documents to a single agreement. A
franchise or distribution agreement may contain exhibits or attachments,
and there may be an issue of whether a forum selection clause contained
in one of the attached documents will apply to the underlying dispute.
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court and a Dallas appel-
late court upheld enforcement of forum selection clauses involving both
multiple parties and multiple documents.
In Lisa Laser USA, Inc., the supreme court addressed the enforceabil-
ity of a forum selection clause that was contained in an exhibit to a distri-
bution agreement, which was signed by all parties.51 The exhibit
specifically referenced only one of the two defendants, however.5 2 Lisa
Germany manufactured medical lasers, and Lisa USA was the distributor




47. Id. at 875.
48. Id. at 880.
49. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
50. Spir Star AG, 310 S.W.3d at 878-79.
51. In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Tex. 2010).
52. Id. at 881-82.
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of those products in the United States. Lisa Germany, Lisa USA, and
HealthTronics, Inc. signed a distribution agreement in 2007 whereby
HealthTronics became the exclusive distributor for certain Lisa Laser
medical devices. The distribution agreement attached eight exhibits, in-
cluding a "Standard Terms and Conditions" exhibit. The terms and con-
ditions applied to sales by Lisa USA to HealthTronics and designated
California as the venue for any disputes arising out of the distribution
agreement. About a year after entering into the distribution agreement,
HealthTronics filed suit against Lisa Germany and Lisa USA alleging vio-
lations of the right of first refusal and breach of the confidentiality and
non-solicitation agreements. HealthTronics filed its suit in Texas where
HealthTronics's headquarters were located. Lisa Germany and Lisa USA
filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, but the trial and ap-
pellate courts denied the motion. The defendants filed a mandamus peti-
tion to the Texas Supreme Court.53
HealthTronics made two principal arguments against enforcement of
the forum selection clause. First, HealthTronics argued that the clause
did not apply to its claims because the clause was limited to claims specifi-
cally related to sales by Lisa USA (which was stated in the preamble
preceding the venue provision). Second, HealthTronics argued that the
clause did not apply to its claims against Lisa Germany because Lisa Ger-
many, although a party to the distribution agreement, was omitted from
the terms of the exhibit containing the forum selection clause. The su-
preme court rejected both these arguments.5 4
The supreme court held that the standard terms and conditions were
not separate from the main document of the distribution agreement. 55
The supreme court observed that the distribution agreement required and
incorporated the additional terms set forth in the exhibits, including the
standard terms and conditions, to "fully elucidate the parties' agree-
ment. ' 56 The supreme court analyzed the parties' intent when entering
into the distribution agreement with several exhibits attached. "The Dis-
tribution Agreement and the Exhibits were intended to be one docu-
ment. ' 57 Because the forum selection clause contained broad language
intended to cover "any dispute," the clause was not limited to only dis-
putes from sales transactions. 58
The supreme court also rejected HealthTronics' argument that sought
to disallow Lisa Germany's reliance on the clause. 59 Lisa Germany was
not a party to a prior agreement between Lisa USA and HealthTronics.
Also, Lisa Germany was not referenced in the exhibit containing the
standard terms and conditions. HealthTronics, therefore, argued that the
53. Id.
54. Id.




59. Id. at 886-87.
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forum selection clause was not intended to apply to disputes involving
Lisa Germany. The supreme court expressively stated, "[a] plaintiff can-
not both have his contract and defeat it too."'60 The supreme court con-
cluded that the standard terms and conditions were the default terms
applicable to the distribution agreement in general.61 HealthTronics's
claims against Lisa Germany arose from Lisa Germany's purported obli-
gations under the distribution agreement. Therefore, the parties intended
that the forum selection clause apply to all claims between all parties to
the agreement. 62 The supreme court directed the trial court to vacate its
order and grant the motion to dismiss.63
Similarly, in Dunlap Enterprises v. Roly Poly Franchise Systems,
L.L.C., several franchisees sought to hold a forum selection clause unen-
forceable because "requiring them to litigate their claims in the selected
forum [Georgia] would be unreasonable and would effectively deprive
them of their day in court."'64 The franchisees conceded that the forum
selection clause applied to their claims against the franchisor, Roly Poly.
The franchisees argued that the suit should remain in Texas, however,
because their claims were also asserted against Roly Poly's master devel-
oper, Summers-Wood, who they argued was not subject to jurisdiction in
Georgia. The franchisees' argument was based on a prior federal lawsuit
between Roly Poly and Summers-Wood in which a district court held that
the forum selection clause found in the franchise agreement (i.e., an ex-
hibit to the master development agreement) was not incorporated into
the master development agreement. Based on that ruling, the Georgia
district court held that Georgia lacked personal jurisdiction over Sum-
mers-Wood. The franchisees asserted that because Georgia did not have
jurisdiction over all necessary parties, enforcement of the forum selection
clauses in the franchise agreement would be "unreasonable and unjust. '65
First, the trial court, and later, the appellate court, disagreed.66
The court of appeals noted that the franchisees were not parties to the
prior federal action in Georgia. The franchisees thus failed to show that
res judicata would apply since they would not be bound by the prior rul-
ing of the Georgia district court. Moreover, a different agreement was at
issue in the present suit-the franchise agreement, not the master devel-
opment agreement. Although Summers-Wood was not a party or signa-
tory to the franchise agreement, Summers-Wood could be a
"transactional participant" and thus subject to the forum selection
60. Id. at 886 (citing In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 887.
63. Id.
64. No. 05-08-01556-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5832, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas July
23, 2010, no pet.) (Haynes and Boone attorneys Deborah S. Coldwell, Ben Mesches, and
Altresha Burchett-Williams represented Roly Poly in this action.).
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *8.
2011]
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clauses.67 The franchisees' argument that Summers-Wood would not be
subject to jurisdiction was "mere speculation. '68 Despite arguments of
difficulty, expense, and potential for the "empty-chair" defense cited by
the franchisees, the appellate court concluded that the trial court acted
reasonably in upholding the forum selection clauses.69
Although not technically an issue that arises pursuant to a contractual
forum selection clause, the "first-to-file" rule is important to note when a
forum battle takes place. In Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc. v. BWR McAllen,
Inc., franchisor Buffalo Wild Wings (BWW) sued three franchisees of
Minnesota franchisor Buffalo Wings & Rings (BWR) in a Texas district
court.7° BWW alleged that the franchisees committed trademark and
trade dress violations and had engaged in unfair competition. A year
prior, BWW sued BWR in a Minnesota district court asserting the same
claims for relief. In BWR McAllen, the franchisees sought to stay the
Texas action based on the "first-filed rule."'71
The district court followed the Fifth Circuit's rule when deciding
whether to maintain jurisdiction: "Under the first-to-file rule, when re-
lated cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the
case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases
substantially overlap. ' 72 The district court emphasized that the issues do
not need to be identical; the standard is that the issues only need to "sub-
stantially overlap." The district court held that BWW's factual issues
against BWR as a franchisor were different from BWW's issues with
BWR's franchisees. The franchisees use their own advertisements, wear
different uniforms, and generally adopt individual practices. 73 Therefore,
the Texas district court denied the franchisees' motion to stay, also noting
that the Minnesota court's lack of jurisdiction over the franchisees further
supported the Texas court maintaining jurisdiction.74
C. ARBITRATION
Timeliness is important when seeking to enforce arbitration. In Cott-
man Transmission v. FVLR,75 a landlord (FVLR) sued a franchisor
(Cottman) based on the franchisor's alleged assumption of its franchisee's
lease obligation after termination of the franchise agreement. The suit
went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in FVLR's favor and held
67. Id. at *7 (citing Accelerated Christian Educ., Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 925 S.W.2d 66,
75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ) ("A valid forum selection clause governs all transac-
tion participants, regardless of whether the participants were actual signatories to the
contract.").
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id.
70. No. H-10-1265, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65051, at *2-3. (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2010).
71. Id.
72. Id. at *4.
73. Id. at *6.
74. Id. at *6-7.
75. Cottman Transmission Sys., L.L.C. v. FVLR Enters, L.L.C., 295 S.W.3d 372, 375
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
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against Cottman on its counterclaim. Cottman appealed on ten issues,
including a request for post-verdict arbitration. Cottman asserted that if
it was bound by the lease at issue, it was entitled to resolve its dispute
with FVLR through arbitration. The appellate court ruled that Cottman
was too late. 76 "A party waives arbitration if it takes an action inconsis-
tent with its right to arbitration, that is prejudicial to the other party."77
This appeared to be a simple issue for the court of appeals. A trial and
jury verdict was considered inconsistent with Cottman's right to arbitra-
tion. The appellate court, therefore, held that Cottman waived its right to
arbitration.7 8
In U-Save v. Furlo,79 the Fifth Circuit summarized a few basic princi-
pals involving arbitration clauses. The franchise agreement between U-
Save and the Furlos contained an arbitration clause. Pursuant to motions
by U-Save, the district court compelled arbitration and later confirmed
the arbitrator's award. 80 The Fifth Circuit did not provide many back-
ground facts or the procedural history that had taken place between the
parties. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit affirmed several basic principals.
First, it is important to remember that an appellate court has limited judi-
cial review of arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 81 The bases for review are limited. Second, an arbitration
clause will not be void for public policy when access to a reasonable sub-
stitute is provided for causes of action denied based on a choice-of-law
provision.82 Third, an award of zero damages will not strip the district
court of jurisdiction when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; the
district court can retain jurisdiction to address issues arising from its or-
der to compel arbitration. 83 Lastly, when an arbitration agreement is
controlled by the FAA, a state's common law doctrine for enforceability
is negligible.8 4
Pillar to Post, Inc. v. Weible emphasizes the court's limited judicial re-
view of arbitration awards.8 5 "A court's review of an arbitration award is
'exceedingly deferential,' and any doubt or uncertainty is resolved in
favor of upholding the award."8 6 In Pillar to Post, a franchisor sought to
confirm an arbitration award against its franchisees, restraining the fran-
chisees from using its trademarks without authorization, from violating
the covenant not to compete, and from divulging confidential or other
proprietary information. The arbitration award also granted monetary
relief to the franchisor. In addition to the arbitration award, the
76. Id. at 380.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. U-Save Auto Rental of Am. Inc. v. Furlo, 368 Fed. Appx. 601, 601 (5th Cir. 2010).





85. No. H-09-3227, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64551, *1 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2010).
86. Id. at *4.
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franchisor sought to enforce the prevailing party's attorneys' fee provi-
sion in the franchise agreement. The district court agreed.87 The district
court, however, "encouraged" the parties to agree on the amount of at-
torneys' fees and expenses that would be awarded to the franchisor. 88
Because the franchisees did not provide any evidence or authority to
overcome the deference given to the arbitrator's award, the district court
granted the motion to confirm.8 9
The Fifth Circuit revisited the "direct benefits estoppel" doctrine in a
distribution dispute. In Noble Drilling Services, Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc.,
Noble, (a purchaser of wire mooring rope) sued Bridon (the manufac-
turer) and Certex (the distributor) based on breach of warranty and fraud
claims.90 Noble entered into a sales contract with Certex to purchase
ropes that met the specifications Noble required. Certex, who had a dis-
tribution agreement with Bridon, entered into purchase order agreements
for the specified ropes. Certex and Bridon were the only parties to the
distribution agreement and subsequent purchase order agreements. The
distribution agreement and purchase order agreements each contained an
arbitration clause. When Noble sued Certex and Bridon in district court,
both defendants moved to compel arbitration on the theory that Noble
was bound under the "direct benefits estoppel" rule. Although the dis-
trict court dismissed the action, the Fifth Circuit disagreed and reversed
the district court's dismissal. 91
"Direct-benefit estoppel involve[s] non-signatories who, during the life
of the contract, have embraced the contract despite their non-signatory
status but then, during litigation, attempt to repudiate the arbitration
clause in the contract."' 92 The non-signatory embraces the contract by
seeking (i) benefits under the contract or (ii) to enforce the contract's
terms. Here, the Fifth Circuit held that Noble did not "embrace" either
the distribution agreement or the purchase order agreements. 93 First,
Noble had no knowledge of either agreement prior to litigation. There-
fore, no evidence existed to establish that Noble sought benefits of either
contract. Noble did not know of the agreements' terms and, thus, could
not have "knowingly exploited" the agreements. 94 Second, the evidence
established that Noble's lawsuit was not based on either agreement; No-
ble's lawsuit against both defendants was based on representations prior
to the purchase of any ropes and duties imposed on the manufacturer and
distributor by law.95 The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the defendants' ar-
gument that Noble's lawsuit was an effort to enforce the specifications in
87. Id. at *4-5.
88. Id. at *8.
89. Id. at *4.
90. 620 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2010).
91. Id. at 471.
92. Id. at 473 (citing Hellenic Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, 464 F.3d 514,
517-18 (5th Cir. 2006)).
93. Id. at 474.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 474-75.
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the purchase order agreements. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, reversed the
district court's dismissal and remanded the action.96
IV. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION,
AND NON-RENEWAL
Two cases regarding termination and non-renewal of a franchise agree-
ment came out in favor of the franchisor and set a high bar for franchis-
ees seeking to bring claims of constructive termination/non-renewal and
ineffective termination due to technical non-compliance with the notice
of termination.
The United States Supreme Court issued a rare opinion which relates
directly to franchise law. The case involved constructive termination and
constructive nonrenewal claims brought by sixty-three Shell franchisees
pursuant to the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("the PMPA").97 In
Mac's Shell Service Inc., v. Shell Oil Products Co.,98 the Shell franchisees
brought suit after the franchisor 1) eliminated a volume-based rent sub-
sidy, and 2) offered the franchisees new agreements which changed the
formula for calculating rent, which increased rent for some franchisees. 99
Although the franchisees purportedly considered the franchisor's actions
with respect to the modified rent to be wrongful and a constructive termi-
nation of their existing agreements, the franchisees continued operating
their Shell service stations, purchasing fuel from Shell, and using Shell's
trademarks. Although the franchisees objected to the terms the
franchisor offered for a renewal franchise agreement, the franchisees also
executed the renewal franchise agreements that the franchisor offered
upon expiration of the franchisees' existing agreements.
The Court rejected the franchisees' assertion that the actions of the
franchisor amounted to constructive termination and constructive nonre-
newal of the franchise relationship. 100 While specifically reserving judg-
ment as to whether causes of action for constructive termination or
constructive nonrenewal exist under the PMPA at all,' 0 1 the Court held
that in order for a franchisee to bring a claim for constructive termina-
tion, a franchisee must abandon the use of the franchisor's trademark,
cease purchasing the franchisor's fuel, or abandon occupation of the
franchised premises.10 2 That is, to claim construction termination under
the PMPA, the franchisee must actually stop its franchised business. The
Court analogized the franchisees' situation to the employer/employee
context and landlord/tenant context, which each require as part of a claim
for constructive termination that the employee no longer be employed
and the tenant have left the premises. The Court similarly held that by
96. Id. at 471.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2891 (2006).
98. 130 S. Ct. 1251, 1251 (2010).
99. Id. at 1256.
100. Id. at 1254-55.
101. Id. at 1257 n.4.
102. Id. at 1261-62.
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signing a renewal agreement, even under protest, a franchisee is pre-
cluded from bringing a claim for constructive nonrenewal under the
PMPA.103 The Court emphasized the limited scope of the PMPA, which
regulates only termination and nonrenewal of agreements.1 0 4 The Court
noted that to expand constructive nonrenewal claims under the PMPA to
instances in which franchisees were to sign a new agreement and then
object to its terms would "chill franchisors from proposing new terms in
response to changing market conditions and consumer needs.' 10 5
Since the PMPA preempts state law on the termination and nonre-
newal of petroleum franchises, the U.S. Supreme Court set a high bar for
franchisees seeking to bring such claims in Texas, while explicitly leaving
the door open for claims based on state law rather than the PMPA. 0 6
There was another significant termination case during the Survey pe-
riod. In Ultimate Ford, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Division of the Texas De-
partment of Transportation,10 7 the Austin Court of Appeals addressed an
ineffective termination claim of two franchised Ford dealerships. The
dealerships did not claim that Ford lacked good cause to terminate their
franchise agreements, but rather asserted on appeal that their substantive
rights were prejudiced because Ford's notices of termination did not con-
tain the exact language of the appropriate statute. 10 8
In Ultimate Ford, Mohammed Assadi owned two Ford dealerships,
which had each gone through bankruptcy proceedings twice. 10 9 Ford
sought to terminate the dealerships and sent the franchisee notices of ter-
mination. Although the notices partially conformed to the relevant sec-
tion of the Texas Occupations Code1 10 by providing statements of the
right of the dealerships to file protests, the notices did not track the lan-
guage of the code verbatim."1 Specifically, Ford's notices failed to state
the correct agency to which the franchisee had the right to appeal, and
did not cite the correct statute, chapter 2301 of the Texas Occupations
Code. Instead, the notices cited the predecessor statute, the Motor Vehi-
cle Commission Code, and stated that the franchisee had a right to file a
protest with the Motor Vehicle Commission, which is no longer the
proper entity. 112
The dealerships cited Buddy Gregg Motor Homes, Inc. v. Motor Vehi-
cle Board13 for the proposition that a notice of termination "[M]UST
contain the EXACT word-for-word language" of the disclaimer found in
103. Id. at 1264.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1260.
107. No. 03-09-00548-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7055, *1 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010,
pet. denied).
108. Id. at *7-8.
109. Id. at *2.
110. TEX. Occ. CODE § 2301.453(c)(2) (West 2011).
111. Ultimate Ford, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7055, at *4-5.
112. Id. at *5.
113. 179 S.W.3d 589, 596, 605-07 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
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the statute.1 14 The court disagreed, holding that "any non-compliance
with the notice requirements" does not necessarily invalidate a determi-
nation of good cause. 115
The court in this case found unpersuasive the argument that the dealer-
ships were prejudiced by the non-complying language in the notices, in
part, because the dealerships had, in fact, filed timely protests with the
correct entity and cited the correct statute.1 16 Moreover, the dealerships
went on to exercise their rights by participating in the contested case
hearing that ensued.11 7 Based on this lack of prejudice, the court held
that Ford's notice did not render its termination of the dealerships
invalid.11 8
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Trademark-related litigation often plays a large part in franchisee-
franchisor legal disputes. The ability of a franchisor to use the Lanham
Act to prevent a terminated franchisee from using the franchisor's trade-
marks is one of a franchisor's most powerful tools in litigation. Further-
more, the fact that courts are generally willing to grant preliminary
injunctive relief to protect trademarks means that trademark claims are
often featured prominently early in franchisee-franchisor litigation.
In 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7, Inc., the franchisor sought to enforce
its trademark rights by seeking injunctive relief.11 9 Puerto Rico-7, Inc.
(PRSI) owned area development rights to develop 7-Eleven franchises in
Puerto Rico.120 In exchange for the rights to develop 7-Eleven in Puerto
Rico, PRSI was required to develop certain numbers of 7-Eleven stores
in Puerto Rico by certain dates, pay monthly royalties to 7-Eleven, and
maintain a certain amount of operational capital. 121 In 2007, PRSI had
failed to open the required number of stores, failed to make royalty pay-
ments, and failed to maintain the required level of capital, as evidenced
by payment disputes with vendors. 122 7-Eleven, Inc. sent PRSI a default
notice and provided an opportunity for a cure period, but PRSI failed to
cure its defaults apart from paying the past-due royalties.' 23 7-Eleven
brought suit, alleging claims of, among other things, trademark infringe-
ment, unfair competition, and breach of contract, they also sought a de-
claratory judgment that the development agreement was validly
terminated.1 24
114. Ultimate Ford, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7055, at *10.
115. Id. at *12.
116. Id. at *6, *14.
117. Id. at *6.
118. Id. at *16-17.
119. See generally 7-11, Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7 Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0140-B, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115064, *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2009).
120. Id. at *2-3.
121. Id. at *3-4.
122. Id. at *6-7.
123. Id. at *7-8.
124. Id. at *9-10.
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The court granted 7-Eleven's motion for summary judgment.125 The
court first recognized that "[w]hether Defendants' alleged use of the 7-
ELEVEN Marks constitute[d] infringement or unfair competition turns
on [whether 7-Eleven] validly terminated the [development agreement]
that had previously authorized PRSI to use those marks. ' 126 The court
therefore analyzed 7-Eleven's contract claims before it even reached the
trademark claims.1 27 When the court did turn to 7-Eleven's trademark
claims, its analysis was straightforward. The court noted that any use of
7-Eleven's trademarks by PRSI after the development agreement was
terminated was unauthorized and that "PRSI 'is an ex-licensee, and the
law is clear that termination of a trademark license precludes further use
by the licensee." 128 The court stated that the primary purpose of alleg-
ing trademark infringement is to "protect the ability of consumers to dis-
tinguish among [competitors]," 129 and that "'[c]ommon sense compels
the conclusion that a strong risk of consumer confusion arises when a
terminated franchisee continues to use the former franchisor's trade-
marks.'"130 The court granted 7-Eleven an injunction on its trademark
claim, recognizing that PRSI's continued use of 7-Eleven's trademarks
impacted the entire 7-Eleven chain: "When unauthorized use of service
marks wrongly identify Defendants' formerly-licensed locations with [7-
Eleven], the resulting injury impacts the entire [7-Eleven] chain.' 13'
From a trademark perspective, 7-Eleven presents a good recent exam-
ple of the relatively straight-forward elements involved in obtaining relief
when a former franchisee operates without an in-force trademark license.
In addition, 7-Eleven shows the crucial importance for a franchisor to
make sure it carefully follows the proper procedure under the relevant
contracts to terminate the franchise agreement. The 7-Eleven court ex-
plicitly recognized that 7-Eleven's trademark claims depended upon
whether its contract with PRSI was appropriately terminated, and the
court went into great factual detail in analyzing 7-Eleven's various default
notices.132 Consequently, franchisors must always be mindful of concepts
such as cure periods, notice requirements in that they may well ultimately
prove vital in protecting a franchisor's intellectual property. Conversely,
franchisee counsel should never assume that a franchise agreement has
been properly terminated and should always make sure that the
125. Id. at *36.
126. Id. at *16.
127. For a discussion of the contract-related elements of the court's decision, see infra p.
134-35.
128. Id. at *27 (quoting Ramada Franchise Sys. Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-
0306-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6650, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2001)).
129. Id. (quoting Epperdorf-Netheter-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355
(5th Cir. 2002)).
130. Id. at *28 (quoting Hawkins Pro-Cuts, Inc. v. DJT Hair, Inc., No. 3:96-CV-1728-R,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22418, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 1997)).
131. Id. at *30.
132. Id. at *6-10.
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franchisor has adequately complied with all of the franchise agreement's
requirements for termination.
Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Gharbi presents a franchise-related
cybersquatting case out of the bankruptcy court for the Western District
of Texas. 13 3 Mohammad Gharbi operated as a Century 21 real estate
sales franchise in Austin and Bastrop, Texas. 134 Gharbi's franchise was
terminated for failure to pay amounts due to Century 21.135 Gharbi filed
for bankruptcy, and Century 21 Real Estate LLC (Century 21) filed a
motion for summary judgment on its adversary claims alleging trademark
infringement and cybersquatting.1 36 Gharbi was involved with four rele-
vant websites: www.texascentury2l.com; www.century2lonline.com; www
.texasproperties.com/century2lcapitalteam; and www.austinhomeland
.com. 137 The Century 21 trademark was either explicitly part of the do-
main name of these sites or was displayed on the front page.1 38 Century
21 contended that the websites violated the Lanham Act and the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"). 139
First, the court considered the websites under the Lanham Act. Gharbi
argued that he was not using the trademarks "in commerce" as required
by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125 because he was selling his own property.1 40
It was undisputed that Century 21 itself had no interest in any of the
properties sold by Gharbi. 14 1 The court rejected this argument, holding
that "whether or not the Debtor was only selling his own property does
not make the Defendant's use of the Century 21 mark non-commer-
cial."' 142 Moreover, as the websites were offering real estate services to
the general public, Gharbi's use of the Century 21 mark in connection
with them was commercial. 143 Century 21 thus provides a reminder of the
wide reach of the Lanham Act's "commerce" requirement.
Turning to the traditional Lanham Act analysis, the court stated that
"selling real estate from a website with a domain name that includes Cen-
tury 21 or that displays the Century 21 mark on its front page would
cause a consumer to assume the agent is someone connected to Century
21."144 The court concluded that Century 21 was entitled to an injunction
on its Lanham Act claim.145
133. No. 08-11023-CAG, Adv. No. 08-01099-CAG, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1247, at *1
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. April 19, 2010). For a discussion of a damages-related element of the
court's decision, see infra p. 144-45.
134. Id. at *1-2.
135. Id. at *2.
136. Id. at *2-3.
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id. at *10-11.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id. at *9.
141. Id. at *13.
142. Id. at *9.
143. Id. at *9-10.
144. Id. at *11 (citing Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prod. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 220 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
145. Id. at *16.
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Lastly, the court considered Century 21's ACPA claims. Under ACPA,
a person is liable if the person:
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a per-
sonal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registra-
tion of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that
mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to
or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section
706 of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36.146
ACPA provides a list of nonexclusive factors for a court to use in deter-
mining bad faith. 147 The court held that there was insufficient evidence
to grant summary judgment for Century 21 on its ACPA claim. 148 The
court stated that although Gharbi did not change the websites when his
Century 21 franchise was terminated, that, in itself, does not show bad
faith because "it is also possible that the Defendant was simply slow to
act in removing the mark and shutting down the businesses' websites.
'149
Moreover, although registering a domain name with intent to profit from
a lawful trademark owner indicates bad faith under the statute, the court
noted that "at the time the Defendant registered the domain names he
had the right to use the Century 21 mark and used the mark specifically
because of its association with the Plaintiff's services, real estate
brokering. 150
Century 21 therefore demonstrates a potential roadblock for
franchisors attempting to use ACPA against terminated franchisees. The
statute requires showing bad faith, and as was the case in Century 21,
most franchisees will have initially registered their domain names and set
up their websites in the beginning of the franchise relationship, when the
franchise agreement's trademark license was in effect. Century 21 thus
illustrates the difference between traditional Lanham Act claims, for
which the court granted Century 21's motion for summary judgment, and
an ACPA claim, for which the court denied summary judgment.
VI. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT
The majority of contract-related disputes center around the most cen-
tral document to the franchise relationship, the franchise agreement. In
pursuing claims based on misuse of intellectual property, the courts make
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006).
147. Id. at § 1125(d)(1)(B) (2006).
148. Century 21, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1247, at *20-22.




clear that the key to obtaining injunctive relief to protect a franchisor's
trademarks is to show that the trademark license agreement (the
franchise agreement) and/or the development agreement have been ter-
minated. The case of 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7, Inc., discussed in
Part IV for its trademark-related holdings, emphasizes the importance of
proper termination.
As noted above, the court in 7-Eleven, Inc. first analyzed the plaintiff
franchisor 7-Eleven's contract claims in order to determine whether the
defendant franchisee PRSI's intellectual property license was properly
terminated. 151 7-Eleven claimed that PRSI was in default of the develop-
ment agreement for failure to pay royalties, failure to maintain adequate
capitalization, and failure to open enough stores to meet the area devel-
opment schedule. 152 PRSI claimed that it repaid all the delinquent royal-
ties and that the other defaults were not material. 153
The court held that failure to open the required number of stores under
the area development agreement was a material breach. 154 Furthermore,
PRSI did not rebut the evidence presented by 7-Eleven that PRSI was
operating with insufficient capital resulting in stores with empty shelves,
and the court granted 7-Eleven summary judgment. 155 The court also
granted 7-Eleven summary judgment on its claim for breach of the devel-
opment agreement's post-termination provisions requiring, among other
things, discontinuing the use of 7-Eleven's trademarks.156 This holding
was key to the court's intellectual property rulings, discussed in Part V
above: "[b]ecause the Court determined that the ALA was appropriately
terminated, any continued use of the 7-ELEVEN Marks was unautho-
rized. '157 The court in 7-Eleven, Inc. thus spelled out the importance of
the franchise agreement in franchisor-franchisee litigation.
B. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
Although mostly concerned with federal pleading requirements, Wilkin
Partners, L.P. v. Champps Operating Corp. provides a demonstration of
the federal pleading requirements for fraud and misrepresentation. 158
The Wilkin Partners plaintiff alleged that representatives of the "defend-
ants" fraudulently induced it to enter into a Champps franchise agree-
ment by failing to disclose certain negative information about the
151. 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0140-B, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115064, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2009).
152. Id. at *18.
153. Id. at *19.
154. Id. at *20 (citing Bennigan's Franchising Co., L.P. v. Swigonski No. 3, No. 06-CV-
2300-BH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14871, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2008)).
155. Id. at *20-21.
156. Id. at *21-23. See Section VIII, infra 144-45, for a discussion of the specific per-
formance remedy ordered by the court.
157. Id. at *27.
158. See generally Wilkin Partners, L.P. v. Champps Operating Corp., No. SA-10-CV-
562-XR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808, *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2010).
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location in question.159 The plaintiff names Champps Operating Corpo-
ration and Champps Entertainment of Texas, Inc. in the petition, which
was originally filed in Texas state court.160 The defendants removed to
the Western District of Texas based on diversity jurisdiction even though
Champps Entertainment was a Texas company, arguing that it had been
improperly joined.161
In analyzing the improper joinder argument, the court first conducted a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) analysis. 162 The plaintiff alleged
that the "'defendants' made misrepresentations or failed to disclose ma-
terial information it was under a duty to disclose, without specifying
whether any particular misrepresentation or knowing omission was made
by a representative of Champps Operating or Champps Entertain-
ment."'1 63 The court held that this was not enough to satisfy Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements for fraud,
which requires specifying the allegedly fraudulent statements, including
stating when and where they were made, and explaining why the state-
ments were fraudulent. 164 The ultimate decision of the court in Wilkin
Partners did not depend on this analysis since it applied to both defend-
ants equally and a finding of improper joinder cannot be based on a defi-
ciency applicable to both diverse and non-diverse defendants. 165
Nonetheless, Wilkin Partners is a reminder of the necessity of pleading
fraud with particularity even in state court, since the plaintiff's petition
will be subject to a Federal Rule 9(b) analysis if a defendant chooses to
remove the case.
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Ascension v. Thind Hotels, LLC, the Southern District of Texas con-
sidered a vicarious liability claim brought against Holiday Inns, Inc. in an
employment discrimination context. 166 Plaintiff Edgar Ascension alleged
that he was sexually harassed at work at a Holiday Inn Express in The
Woodlands, Texas. 167 Ascension brought suit against his employer (an
employment agency), the corporate owner of the hotel franchise, and the
franchisor, Holiday Inns, Inc. ("HII"), alleging claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168 HII moved to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment. 69
159. Id. at *1-2.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id. at *2-3 (citing Smallwood v. I11. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir.
2004)).
163. Id. at *7.
164. Id. at *7-8 (citing Sullivan v. Leor Energy, 600 F.3d 542, 550 (5th Cir. 2010)).
165. Id. at *8.
166. No. H-09-792, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10504, *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2010).
167. Id.




HII made a creative argument for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6): be-
cause the complaint alleged that HII was not registered to do business in
Texas, HII could not have been Ascension's employer and thus would not
be liable under the Title VII claims.170 The court rejected this argument
on the basis that it ignored the possibility of a non-registered entity none-
theless operating in Texas in violation of the Business Organization
Code.171 The court did accept HII's more conventional argument that it
was not Ascension's employer as demonstrated by the affidavit of HII's
vice president of franchise operations, which essentially provided that
HII did not own or control the hotel at issue. 172 Ascension provides a
concise demonstration that vicarious liability claims against franchisors,
such as Ascension's Title VII claims, that may be defeated on a motion
for summary judgment may nonetheless pass Rule 12(b)(6) muster.
VII. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. ANTITRUST
In PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered whether the district court had properly granted a manu-
facturer's motion to dismiss after the United States Supreme Court
reversed its Dr. Miles' per se rule relating to resale price maintenance
(RPM) agreements. 173 Leegin manufactured and distributed handbags,
belts, jewelry, and other "Brighton" brand products. 174 Leegin had a
dual distribution system, whereby it distributed Brighton products to
wholesalers and sold Brighton products in its retail stores.175 Leegin had
a resale price maintenance policy with its wholesalers, whereby the
wholesalers could not sell Brighton products below a certain price.176
PSKS, the owner of a retail store that sold Brighton products, violated
that policy and sold its Brighton products at a discounted price. 177 When
PSKS refused to abide by Leegin's price policy, Leegin ceased selling
Brighton products to PSKS.1 78 In this action, PSKS alleged that Leegin
had improperly entered into a vertical RPM agreement. 179 A jury
awarded nearly $4 million to PSKS, and Leegin appealed.1 80
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the United
States Supreme Court held that RPM agreements were pre se im-
170. Id. at *7-8.
171. Id. at *8.
172. Id. at *8-9. HI also argued, and the court apparently agreed, that HI was enti-
tled to summary judgment because HI1 was not named in Ascension's EEOC complaint,
and, therefore, Ascension's administrative remedies were not exhausted with respect to
HII. Id. at *9.
173. 615 F.3d 412, 414 (5th Cir. 2010).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 414-15.







proper. 181 Upon reexamination, the Supreme Court held that "vertical
price restraints, like vertical nonprice restraints, often have procompeti-
tive justifications and should be judged under the rule of reason."'1 82 The
Supreme Court "recognized that the 'economics literature is replete with
procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer's use of resale price
maintenance."' 18 3 Instead of a per se violation, vertical price restraints
are now judged under the rule of reason. 184
On remand, PSKS amended its complaint, asserting additional facts
and claims against Leegin. 185 Among other things, PSKS alleged that
Leegin was involved in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy and that con-
sumers were required to pay artificially high and anticompetitive prices
for Brighton products. 186 In reviewing the dismissal of PSKS's complaint
for failure to plead a plausible relevant market under the rule of reason,
the Fifth Circuit addressed whether PSKS had established that Leegin's
actions had caused an injury to competition.187 The Fifth Circuit held
that PSKS did not meet its burden. 88 PSKS failed to sufficiently define
the relevant product and geographic markets.189 The Fifth Circuit ex-
plained that Brighton did not constitute its own market nor did "whole-
sale sale" adequately define the relevant market (not the distribution
level). 190 In addition to its failure to define the market to support its
anticompetitive claims, PSKS also failed to show any anticompetitive
harm.191 The Fifth Circuit rejected PSKS's "artificially high prices"
claim, explaining that Leegin and its retailers may provide "interbrand
competition" through its prices and services. 192 PSKS also failed to allege
any facts that would support any plausible anticompetitive effect.193
PSKS did not assert that a group of retailers or one dominant retailer was
the source of the RPM policy.194 Leegin was the purported largest single
retailer; thus, independent Brighton retailers could not be the source of
the RPM policy.' 95 The Fifth Circuit, likewise, rejected PSKS's horizon-
tal restraint claim.' 96 Leegin's actions as a "dual distributor" did not sup-
port PSKS's claim that the RPM policy was a horizontal restraint. 197
181. 220 U.S. 373, 384 (1911).
182. PSKS, Inc., 615 F.3d at 414 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 (2007)).
183. Id. at 415.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 416.
186. Id.
187. id. at 417.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 418.
190. Id.





196. Id. at 420.
197. Id. at 420-21.
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B. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
1. Non-Competition Agreement Enforced
Courts continue to apply a reasonableness test when construing a cove-
nant not to compete, particularly in a franchise context. In Bonus of
America, Inc. v. Angel Falls Services, L.L.C., a Minnesota district court,
applying Texas law, held that a franchisee "may not avoid his
covenent[sic] not to compete" by doing what he agreed not to do himself
through a different entity.198 Bonus of America, Inc. is a cleaning busi-
ness franchisor. 199 In 2007, Bonus of America entered into franchise
agreements with Gavin Hart and his business entity, Angel Falls Services,
L.L.C.20 0 Hart also executed a personal guarantee in connection with the
franchise agreements. 20 1 Pursuant to the franchise agreements and guar-
antee (which were governed by Texas law), Hart and Angel Falls agreed
not to "[o]wn, maintain, engage in or have any interest in any business
which sells goods or services of a like competitive nature" as his Bonus of
America franchise. 20 2 In seeking to obtain injunctive relief to enforce its
covenant not to compete, Bonus of America alleged that Hart played a
significant role in a similar cleaning and maintenance business, Patron
Supply, Inc.20 3 Hart denied any violation of the covenant not to
compete.204
The district court considered four factors for the preliminary injunc-
tion: (1) irreparable harm, (2) balance of harms, (3) likelihood of success,
and (4) public interest.205 Because the record showed that Hart had been
involved with a competing business such as Patron, Bonus of America
met its burden to show irreparable harm through loss of goodwill. 206 The
district court also acknowledged that Patron's operations may be harmed
if Hart was not able to operate. 20 7 The district court held that Hart's
"self-inflicted" harm would not outweigh the harm to Bonus of America's
reputation and goodwill as a result of Hart's violation of the franchise
agreements. 208
The district court analyzed enforceability of the covenant not to com-
pete under Texas law.20 9
Under Texas law, covenants not to compete are enforceable if they
are: ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the
time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations
198. No. 10-2111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67079, at *8 (D. Minn. July 6, 2010).
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id. at *2-3.
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *3-4
203. Id. at *5.
204. Id. at *6.
205. Id. at *6-7.
206. Id. at *8.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *12.
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as to the time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be re-
strained that are reasonable...210
The "otherwise enforceable" requirement for enforcement of covenants
not to compete occasionally creates an issue in franchisor/franchisee dis-
putes. The Minnesota district court outlined the promises outside the
covenant that constitute an enforceable agreement. 21' Bonus of America
disclosed confidential information and permitted Hart and Angel Falls to
use its system.2 12 In return, Hart and Angel Falls agreed to pay royalties,
keep the disclosed information confidential, and to refrain from competi-
tion within the assigned franchise territory.213 Because the time (two
years) and geographical area (50-mile radius) were reasonable, the dis-
trict court held that the covenant not to compete was enforceable. 214 The
district court, therefore, granted the preliminary injunction. 215
VIII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In 7-Eleven, Inc., discussed above in Parts V and VI.A, 7-Eleven
sought specific performance as a remedy for the breach of the post-termi-
nation provisions, and the court granted 7-Eleven's request.216 The court
noted that specific performance is appropriate under Texas law when
monetary damages are insufficient, and the court found that PRSI's con-
tinued display of 7-Eleven's trademarks constituted such irreparable
harm.2 17 Although requests for injunctive relief concerning post-termina-
tion franchise agreement provisions most often come in the form of Lan-
ham Act-based relief, 7-Eleven demonstrates that the contract law
remedy of specific performance can be asserted as an alternative means
to protect intellectual property.
In addition to 7-Eleven, Inc., one other noteworthy damages-related
analysis occurred in Century 21. As discussed above in Part V, the Cen-
tury 21 court denied Century 21's motion for summary judgment on its
ACPA claim, holding that there was insufficient evidence of the required
bad faith.218 Century 21 argued that in the event that there is eventually
a finding of bad faith under ACPA, that finding would demonstrate the
"willful and malicious injury" by the debtor that would make the result-
ing debt in bankruptcy non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 219
The court disagreed and noted that for there to be the level of "willful
210. Id. at *12-13 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2011)).
211. Id. at *13.
212. Id. at *14.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *17.
216. 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0140-B, 2009 U.S. DIST. LEXIS
115064, at *23-24 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2009).
217. Id. at *23 (citing Stafford v. Southern Vanity Magazine, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 530, 535
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied)).
218. Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. Gharbi, No. 08-11023, Adv. No. 08-01099-CAG,
2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1247, at *21-22 (Bankr. W.D. Tex April 19, 2010).
219. Id. at *23-24.
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and malicious injury" required for non-dischargeability in bankruptcy,
the debtor "must have intended the actual injury to result from his ac-
tions. ''220 At least according to this court, even if a franchisor could es-
tablish bad faith in a cybersquatting case against a bankrupt franchisee,
that alone would not be enough to make the resulting debt non-
dischargeable.
IX. CONCLUSION
Similar to years past, during the Survey period, Texas and federal
courts reaffirmed the importance of the contractual nature of the rela-
tionship between franchisors and franchisees, and also continued to em-
phasize compliance with procedural requirements. In SmallBizPros, the
Fifth Circuit reminded franchisors and district courts alike that some of
the terms of any settlement agreement should be incorporated into a stip-
ulated settlement order for the district court to retain jurisdiction, as "in-
exact compliance is no compliance. ' 221 Where exact compliance would
be illogical, however, as in Ultimate Ford, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Division
of the Texas Department of Transportation, courts recognize it may not be
required.
Throughout the past year, multiple franchisors also addressed the inap-
propriate and continued use of their marks by franchisees and other par-
ties following termination of an agreement. Such cases highlight the
importance of ensuring that agreements adequately address the use of
trademarks upon termination and that agreements are, in fact, terminated
properly. In 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Puerto Rico-7, Inc., the court relied upon a
finding that the agreement had been validly terminated to determine
whether unauthorized use of the marks occurred. In Century 21 Real Es-
tate, LLC v. Gharbi, Century 21 fought the continued use of its trade-
marks and name by a terminated franchisee. Even though the court
granted the injunction against further use of the marks under the Lanham
Act, the court did not find that the franchisee had acted in bad faith,
precluding claims under the ACPA.
220. Id. at *24 (citing In re Delaney, 97 F.3d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1996)).
221. SmallBizPros v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010).
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